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‘For the Times they Are A-Changin’: Explaining
Voting Patterns of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
through Identification of Micro-Publics
Jeff Yates, Justin Moeller & Brian Levey*

Abstract
In assessing how social forces may shape U.S. Supreme Court Justices’
decision-making it has been presumed that there is a singular public opinion
and that this opinion affects each individual Justice in largely the same fashion. We suggest that it is more likely the case that Justices’ world views are
informed and shaped by a myriad of social concerns and group identities upon
which the Justices structure and process their experiences and develop and refine their personal schemas. While some have already begun to question the
proposition of a monolithic public opinion influence on judicial behavior and
have begun to think carefully about what we term the “micro-publics” that
may inform Supreme Court Justices’ decision-making, the more tangible
questions of whether Justices respond to publics that are distinguishable from
broad-based national public opinion and what those micro-publics might be
remain largely unanswered. Our study focuses on the potential influence of
localized and personal micro-publics and the possibility of partisan-based elite
influence on judicial behavior. We test our hypotheses by analyzing the voting
record of Supreme Court Justices on civil liberties cases from 1977 to 2003
and find encouraging initial support for our theory.
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Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don’t stand in the doorway
Don’t block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There’s a battle outside
And it is ragin’.
It’ll soon shake your windows
And rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin’.
– Bob Dylan1

I. Introduction
During the hearings following his nomination to the Supreme
Court by President Richard Nixon, Harry Blackmun reflected that
“judges, even Supreme Court Justices, are human, and I suppose attitudes change as we go along.”2 His comment certainly seems prescient
as both critics and supporters of his jurisprudential decision-making
largely agree that the ideological tenor of his voting drifted in a liberal
direction during his tenure on the Court. But ideological drift on the
Court actually involves a fairly broad array of Justices and, as Epstein
and her associates demonstrate, such ideological drift reveals itself in
Justice voting patterns that, over time, shift to the right as well as to

1. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
(Sony BMG Music Entertainment 1964).
2. Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference
Change, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 1209, 1209–10 (2005) (citing Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
on the nomination of Harry A. Blackmun of Minn., to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 91st Cong. 43 (1970) (statement of Harry Blackmun)).
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the left.3 Epstein et al.’s documentation of such trends in Justices’ voting run counter to traditional accounts of judicial behavior which have
long held that Justices’ ideological preferences and voting behavior are
largely stable over time.4
The prospect that Justices’ ideological preferences (at least as revealed in their patterns of case voting) are not that stable but are rather,
consistent with Blackmun’s candid statement, apt to change over time,
prompts us to begin thinking about what forces might precipitate such
fluidity in judicial behavior. Research by Baum5 suggests that Justices,
as human decision makers, are influenced by their relevant “audiences.” He explains that Supreme Court Justices, like anyone else, live
in a world of personal interactions and social engagements and, accordingly, their attitudes and actions on the Court are likely to reflect
that set of relevant social references, at least to some degree.
The proposition that Justices take into account and draw upon
concerns that are external to their existing ideology or relevant legal
considerations in deciding cases is not new. Indeed, one of the more
prominent threads of study in judicial politics concerns the question of
whether Justices decide cases in a manner that is generally responsive
to majoritarian preferences.6 While, on balance, this literature indicates that Justices of the Supreme Court are in fact responsive to national public opinion in their decision-making, the exact causal mechanism for this influence has not been clearly established or agreed
upon. The dominant view appears to be that Justices react to public
opinion strategically and, therefore, tend not to veer too far from majoritarian preferences in their decision-making in order to amass and

3. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When,
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (tracking the ideological voting of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices over time).
4. See generally Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801 (1998) (assessing whether Justices’ voting is static over
the course of their careers on the High Court).
5. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE
ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (suggesting that judges

are concerned with personal peer groups

when making legal policy).
6. See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 87 (1993) (providing empirical evidence that Justices vote in a majoritarian manner).
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maintain a reservoir of good will with the public—so as to protect the
legitimacy, independence, and vitality of the Court as a political institution.7 Baum argues that for a number of reasons this explanation for
Supreme Court responsiveness is rather untenable and posits a largely
ignored alternative possibility: that Justices typically decide cases in a
manner generally congruent with the tenor of public opinion because
they, like most people, simply seek approval and want to be well
thought of, both in their daily lives and in how history judges them.8
This proposition is well supported by the lessons learned from social
psychology and established theories concerning individual self-esteem,
how individuals organize and process information, and the structuring
of individuals’ belief systems.9 Of course, these two ostensibly competing pathways of influence are actually by no means mutually exclusive;
both could be casting an important influence on Justices’ thought and
decision processes in case voting. Justices could act as strategic players
who wish to preserve institutional legitimacy capital while simultaneously, and perhaps unwittingly, they are being conditioned by the social interactions, events, and stimuli that inform their daily lives.
Bob Dylan’s famous song lyrics, set forth at the beginning of this
paper, admonished government actors to heed the rapidly changing
tide of “the times.” However, assessing “the times” for a particular individual, or set of individuals, can be a deceptively complex endeavor.
For example, consider the differences, in both degree and kind, of the
social forces and opinions that might influence a person living in
Berkeley, California in the 1960s versus those impacting a citizen residing in Jackson, Mississippi during the same time period. Are “the
times” the same for these individuals? Do nationally based public opinion estimates of “the times” accurately reflect either person’s set of relevant experiences or social influences? In assessing how the social
forces of public opinion shape Supreme Court Justices’ decision-making, scholars have traditionally considered public opinion as somewhat

7. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L.
279 (1957).
8. See BAUM, supra note 5, at 66.
9. See, e.g., Pamela Johnston Conover & Stanley Feldman, How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 95 (1984).
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of a monolith. In other words, it has been presumed that there is one,
singular public opinion and that it affects the individual Justices in
largely the same fashion. On this point, we disagree with the vast majority of existing judicial politics literature written on this matter. We
believe that it is more likely the case that Justices’ world views are informed and shaped by a myriad of social concerns and group identities
upon which these individuals structure and process their experiences
and develop and refine their personal schemas.10
While some have already begun to question the proposition of a
monolithic public opinion influence on judicial behavior11 and have
begun to think carefully about what we term the “micro-publics” that
may inform Supreme Court Justices’ decision-making, the more tangible questions of whether Justices respond to publics that are distinguishable from broad-based national public opinion and what those
micro-publics might be, remains largely unanswered. In this paper we
offer useful insights toward addressing this important puzzle in judicial
decision-making by providing a direct empirical test of the proposition
that Justices are influenced by social groups or micro-publics with
which they identify in their case voting decisions.
Our study unfolds in the following manner: in the next section of
this paper we briefly examine the existing literature on how Justices
respond to external cues or influences and develop our theory of micro-publics’ influence on judicial decision-making. In the section that
follows, we set forth our approach and outline our hypotheses and relevant controls. Specifically, our study focuses on the potential influence of localized and personal micro-publics and the possibility of partisan-based elite influence. We test our hypotheses by analyzing
Supreme Court Justice voting on civil liberties cases12 from 1977 to

10. See generally Pamela Johnston Conover, The Influence of Group Identifications on Political
Perception and Evaluation, 46 J. POL. 760 (1984).
11. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 5.
12. Here, civil liberties cases include five Issue Areas in the U.S. Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). These include criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, and privacy cases. Civil liberties cases constituted a significant portion of the Court’s docket during the time period examined and tend to be
the most salient and newsworthy matters that the Court handles. Thus, we feel that they are
especially appropriate in assessing how the Justices may analyze such legal issues in light of the
milieu of social signals that inform their daily lives. We reserve discussion of other matters that
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2003 and find encouraging initial support for our theory. Finally, we
discuss the implications of our findings and suggest useful avenues for
future research.

II. Deciding Cases in the Shadow of Public Opinion:
Who Are the Justices’ Relevant Micro-Publics?
Traditional studies concerning public opinion and Supreme Court
decision-making focused on the proposition posed in Mr. Dooley’s
well-known axiom that “No matter whether th’ constitution follows
th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ ilicition returns.”13 In essence, the question was whether the Supreme Court works as a majoritarian or counter-majoritarian institution. The classic view that the
Court acts as a counter-majoritarian institution was perhaps most notably challenged by Robert Dahl, who concurred with Mr. Dooley’s
sentiments and argued that, except for periods of political transition or
realignment, the High Court was inclined to side with the dominant
national political alliance and seldom ruled against it to protect minority interests.14 While some challenged this notion,15 a river of studies
subsequently emerged that supported Dahl and found a congruence
between majoritarian public opinion and Supreme Court decisionmaking. However, Dahl and his progeny carefully qualified their arguments by noting that any such link between majority opinion and
Court policy making is likely due to the fact that Presidents and the
Senate (both of whom have an electoral connection) have historically
replaced Justices on a fairly regular basis, thus keeping the Court tied
to majoritarian views.16 While most would not discount the influence
of judicial selection on Court policy making, there remains the possibility that the Court is also directly responsive to majoritarian opinion,

inhabit the Court’s docket (e.g. antitrust cases) to future research endeavors.
13. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 6, at 87 (quoting Finley Peter Dunne).
14. See generally Dahl, supra note 7.
15. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policymaking, 70 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 5066 (1976) (arguing that the Court’s propensity to act independently of dominant political coalition was underestimated).
16. See Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 6, at 88–89.
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well beyond any congruence already fostered by an electoral connection via Justice replacement. Mishler and Sheehan17 and Norpoth and
Segal18 famously debated this issue with neither side emerging as the
clear winner. However, the majority of subsequent work on this issue
has come to embrace and support the proposition that national public
opinion exerts a direct and independent influence on Supreme Court
Justices’ voting.19 Indeed, in discussing the results of their 1997 study,
Flemming and Wood acknowledged the well-documented correlation
between public opinion and Court outcomes and then boldly added
“[f]ar less obvious and much more controversial has been the possibility of a direct connection tying the Court and Justices to changes in
public opinion after appointment. Our analysis settles this controversy.”20 While a few dissenting voices remain on this issue,21 there
does appear to be near consensus favoring a direct link between majority national opinion and Court policy making.
Perhaps less clear or settled in the relevant literature is the actual
causal mechanism for such an effect. Two primary explanations exist
for the direct link between public opinion and Court policy making.
The most dominant rationale is that Justices respond to majority opinion as rational and strategic political actors who seek to maintain public
legitimacy as a means to facilitate their viability as a policy-making entity (e.g. get their decisions effectively enforced) and to protect their
autonomy from incursion by other primary political institutions.22

17. Id.
18. See generally Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Comment: Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994) (providing an invited response to Mishler
and Sheehan’s article).
19. See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited:
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004) (reviewing the literature and providing additional evidence of direct effect).
20. Roy B. Flemming & Dan B. Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice
Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 492 (1997).
21. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
22. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 7; FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW
SUPREME COURT: A COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); McGuire & Stimson, supra note 19;
James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543 (1995).

ON THE
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This “rational anticipation” explanation is well-articulated by Stimson,
MacKuen, and Erikson:
[J]ustices who wish to exert authority over the direction of American
life will anticipate actions of the other branches of government. Further, institutionally minded justices will want to avoid public defeat
and the accompanying weakening of the Court’s implicit authority:
they will compromise in order to save the institution. All this implies
paying some attention to what the public wants from government.23

This rationale also finds some support in the rhetoric of Supreme
Court Justices. Consider Chief Justice Rehnquist’s closing remarks in
his 2000 speech on historical threats to the Court’s independence:
I suspect the Court will continue to encounter challenges to its independence and authority by the other branches of government because of the design of our Constitutional system. The degree to which
that independence will be preserved will depend again in some measure on
the public’s respect for the judiciary.24

Implicit in Rehnquist’s statement is the idea that Court members
pay careful attention to the winds of public opinion so as to gauge what
actions might be considered within the realm of those acceptable to
the populace and therefore not apt to diminish the public’s support for
the Court and expose it to external threat.25
The other primary perspective holds that Justices are human decision makers and, as such, perform their duties much like any other

23. See Stimson et al., supra note 22, at 555 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
24. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Reflections on the History and Future of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference (Jun. 16,
2000), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_06-16-00.html (emphasis added).
25. McGuire and Stimson seem to agree, stating:
[A] Court that cares about its perceived legitimacy must rationally anticipate
whether its preferred outcomes will be respected and faithfully followed by relevant publics. Consequently, a Court that strays too far from the broad boundaries
imposed by public mood risks having its decisions rejected. Naturally, in individual cases, the Justices can and do buck the trends of public sentiment. In the
aggregate, however, popular opinion should still shape the broad contours of judicial policymaking.
McGuire & Stimson, supra note 19, at 1019.
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person who is invariably influenced by the social pressures, interactions, and circumstances that they encounter in their daily lives.26 Perhaps curiously, Chief Justice Rehnquist lends a view to this perspective
as well, commenting:
The judges of any court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court
of the United States, work in an insulated atmosphere in their
courthouse where they sit on the bench hearing oral arguments
or sit in their chambers writing opinions. But these same judges
go home at night and read the newspapers or watch the evening
news on television; they talk to their family and friends about
current events. . . . Judges, so long as they are relatively normal
human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public
opinion in the long run than people working at other jobs. In
addition, if a judge on coming to the bench were to decide to seal
himself off hermetically from all manifestations of public opinion, he would accomplish very little; he would not be influenced
by current public opinion, but instead would be influenced by
the state of public opinion at the time he came to the bench.27

Thus, this perspective is not necessarily at odds with the attitudinal
model, except to the extent that some of its proponents argue that Justices’ attitudes and world views are static rather than evolving and not
responsive to external factors. This perspective draws upon well-established social psychology research to suggest that Justices’ world views
may change over time in reaction to their personal experiences, relative
social circumstances, and stimuli.28 Baum believes that this perspective
is much more plausible than the “rational anticipation” view, arguing
that members of the Court are unlikely to adjust their voting to protect
Court legitimacy and viability because the tangible benefits of such actions are merely speculative and it is unlikely that other actors would

26. See, BAUM, supra note 5; Flemming & Wood, supra note 20; Michael Giles et al., The
Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial
Decision-making, 70 J. POL. 293 (2008); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion,
the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision-making: A Micro-Analystic Perspective, 58 J. POL.
169 (1996).
27. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 751, 768–69 (1986).
28. See BAUM, supra note 5; Giles et al., supra note 26; Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 26.

125

YATES (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

2/13/2014 11:41 AM

[Vol. 28

actually threaten the Court due to its strong baseline of diffuse public
support.29
Of course, there is no reason to believe that these two explanations
for direct responsiveness to public opinion are necessarily mutually exclusive. Each mechanism could operate in a way that simultaneously
has its own impact on Justice behavior. Further, these mechanisms may
not be as clearly separated from each other as they initially appear. For
instance, a Justice’s deep caring about how history judges his actions
on the Court may well overlap, conceptually, with his concern over
whether the Court is perceived by the public as legitimate. Certainly,
attempts to parse out the effects of these two causal mechanisms are
welcomed and some useful insights have already been offered.30
However, law and courts scholars’ inordinate focus on the effect of
national-level public opinion, or any singular indicator, on Justices’
policy making may obfuscate what is in fact a more complex and nuanced dynamic. If Justices act as human decision makers and draw
upon external concerns in carrying out their duties on the Court, then
it stands to reason that they may take into account a myriad of social
cues, beyond national-level public opinion. Further, it is plausible that
such cues or social references would be of a more proximate or personal nature than previously considered by the literature. If we assume
that a Justice’s personal outlook and sense of identity provide a lens
through which case stimuli (e.g. case facts, case precedent, statutes,
Constitutional provisions, etc.) are understood, interpreted, and decided, then it is quite reasonable to suggest that social psychology and
related literatures which seek to explain the development and refinement of personal belief systems and schemas31 would be instructive on

29. See BAUM, supra note 5, at 65–67. However, he perhaps too readily focuses on the
potential actual threat to the Court rather than the Justices’ perception of threat to the Court and
their perception that their actions can protect it from incursion. In short, perceptions of threat may
in fact have a stronger influence on behavior than actual threat.
30. See Giles et al., supra note 26.
31. While certainly not an exhaustive explanation, Conover describes schemas in the following manner:
In general, a ‘schema’ may be defined as a cognitive structure of organized
prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances which
guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information. . . . A self-schema may be thought of as the merging or intersection
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this matter. While outstanding applications of social psychology and
related approaches to judicial decision-making are to be found,32 they
are relatively sparse in comparison to legal, attitudinal, or strategic approaches and are extremely rare in the context of studies on the U.S.
Supreme Court.33 In the next section we investigate the possibility that
group identity dynamics may provide leverage on understanding how
Justices make sense of the cases that come before them and arrive at
their legal decisions. More specifically, we posit that we can gain insight on Justices’ case voting behavior by identifying and exploring the
social groups (micro-publics) they may identify with in constructing
their belief systems or schemas. This, in turn, should provide us with
a more nuanced understanding of the lens through which Justices assemble, interpret, and process case stimuli in making their legal
choices.

III. Approach and Research Design
In thinking about the micro-publics that might help shape a Justice’s world view and perhaps his or her case voting, we might consider
what types of group identity information we would examine in a situation in which we had complete access to the Justices’ lives. In this
unrealistic scenario, we might survey a Justice’s significant other, extended family, friends, groups in which he or she is a member (e.g.
alumni associations, civic or professional clubs, etc.), and other people
of two bodies of knowledge: information about the stimuli in some domain
and knowledge of one’s self. . . .
Conover, supra note 10, at 762 (citations omitted).
32. See Jilda Aliotta, Social Backgrounds, Social Motives and Participation on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 267 (1988); Burton Atkins et al., Personality Theory and Judging: A Proposed
Theory of Self Esteem and Judicial Policy-Making, 2 L. & POL’Y Q. 189 (1980); James Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A Representational Model of Judicial Decision-making,
14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 343 (1980); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001).
33. The lack of psychology-based studies on the U.S. Supreme Court Justices is no doubt
due, at least in part, to the fact that such studies typically rely upon interviews or surveys which
are difficult to obtain with regard to the High Court’s members. One psychology-based study
that did analyze U.S. Supreme Court Justice behavior used content analysis of Supreme Court
nominees’ confirmation statements to help provide a psychologically oriented explanation of Justices’ voting behavior and opinion writing after ascending the Court. See Aliotta, supra note 32.
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with whom the Justice interacts with or turns to for information on a
regular basis. The basic idea would be that by gaining such insight on
a Justice’s social environment and group identities, we could more
closely scrutinize the Justice’s “times” or set of relevant social reference
points. Unfortunately, this scenario is not realistic. Accordingly, we
endeavor to find and examine more feasible proxies for a Justice’s social
environment and relevant micro-publics. We focus on three core pathways of micro-public influence: personal-social influences, local work
environment influences, and elite-partisan cues. We outline each of
these core concerns and their related hypotheses in the paragraphs that
follow and then discuss relevant controls.
As indicated in the first section of this paper, our dependent variable is simply a Justice’s vote in civil liberties cases (1 = liberal outcome;
0 = conservative). We examine the Court’s terms from 1977 to 200334
and focus on fully argued cases.
A. Personal-Social Influences
All Justices come from somewhere. They leave established jobs and
social circles to begin work and life anew on the High Court in the
nation’s capital. It is difficult to conceive that the Justices’ split with
their former residences is complete and total. Indeed, many Justices
retain firm ties with their home state and spend significant time there
when the Court is not in session. Could these social environment ties
cast an influence on Justice voting? Tate’s seminal work on Justices’
voting and social backgrounds found the region of Justices’ birth to be
an important consideration in explaining Justices’ lifetime voting propensities in civil liberties cases.35 He later found regional background
to be a significant determinant of judicial voting on the Canadian High
Court.36 On a more general level, political behavior scholars have long

34. The temporal limits of our study are largely constrained by the availability of certain
measures we use in constructing some of our independent variables (e.g. Wright’s measure of
state citizen ideology. Gerald C. Wright et al., Aggregated CBS News/New York Times National
Polls, http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/cbs7603_pct.zip (last visited Nov. 23, 2013)).
35. See generally C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 355 (1981).
36. See generally C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, Decision-making in the Canadian Supreme
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held that social and political environments, groups, and networks help
to shape citizens’ attitudes and views.37 There is also some evidence to
suggest that political elites take attitudinal cues from home state environments in framing their own positions on policy issues. For instance,
Layman and Carsey38 found that shifts in the home state ideological
environment of national political party activists influenced the development and evolution of their positions on abortion policy.39
We believe that Justices’ world views may be influenced by the social mores of their home state on a continual basis and that this influence could reveal itself in their case voting. We measure home state
ideology using Gerald Wright’s annual data on state citizens’ self-identification of their ideological orientation (liberal, conservative, or moderate).40 In constructing this measure we subtract the percentage of
state residents identifying themselves as conservative from the percentage identifying themselves as liberal to produce a “net liberal percentage” score for a given year. Justices’ designated home state is that
identified as their residence at the time of their confirmation.41
Of course it is also possible that Justices take cues from elite home
state political actors. Indeed, Baum and Devins argue that Justices are
more likely to consider political elites as their relevant ‘audience’ in

Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations, 51 J. POL. 900 (1989).
37. See, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, Political Attitudes and the Local Community, 60 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 640 (1966); Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Networks in Context: The Social Flow of
Political Information, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1197 (1987).
38. See generally Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Why Do Party Activists Convert? An Analysis of Individual-Level Change on the Abortion Issue, 51 POL. RES. Q. 723 (1998).
39. In another study, Jackson and Carsey demonstrate that citizens’ voting in presidential
elections is also influenced by group identity concerns, specifically the voter’s state political environment. This finding suggests that theories of citizen voting in national elections are well
advised to consider the geopolitical context of citizen voting behavior in such situations. See generally Robert Jackson & Thomas Carsey, Group Components of U.S. Presidential Voting Across the
States, 21 POL. BEHAV. 123 (1999).
40. See generally Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright & John P. McIver, Public Opinion
in the States: A Quarter Century of Change and Stability in JEFFREY COHEN, ED., PUBLIC OPINION
IN STATE POLITICS

(2006), 229–53.

41. Justices’ home state information was drawn from Lee Epstein’s data set on U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ background information. See http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html.
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constructing their sense of identity and world views.42 Accordingly, we
consider this possibility by incorporating the well-known and oft-used
measure of ideology for state political elite institutional actors produced by Berry and his associates.43 Certainly, Justices will vary in the
degree of their identification with their home state, but, on balance, it
is likely that most Justices draw important information from these
home state environments. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated
with the liberalism of his or her home state’s citizens.
H2: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated
with the liberalism of his or her home state’s elite political actors.
B. Local Work Environment Influences
While Justices may turn to different areas of the country in constructing and maintaining their personal lives, extended social networks, and family ties, they all work in Washington, D.C. In a city in
which the elite makers of national policy roam the sidewalks and 21%
of the population possesses a graduate or professional degree,44 it is
plausible to propose that the Justices’ daily working environment is
distinguishable from the rest of the country. As Baum explains, some
conservative critics of the Court’s policy making have claimed that Justices are swayed by the liberal east coast environment in which they
work and that they tend left in their decision-making over time to gain
favor with the political, media, and social elites who shape the direction
of Washington, D.C. thinking. Indeed, even Justice Scalia has voiced

42. See generally Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010).
43. See generally William Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the
American States, 1960–1993, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998) (using interest groups’ ratings of
states’ members of Congress to infer state citizenry and elite ideology); William Berry et al.,
Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-appraisal, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 117 (2010) (updating authors’ original measure).
44. See

Washington,

District

of

Columbia,

CITY-DATA.COM,

http://www.city-

data.com/city/Washington-District-of-Columbia.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). This level of
advanced education is double that of comparable large cities such as Chicago, Illinois (10%) or
Los Angeles, California (9%).
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such concerns. This phenomenon is sometimes termed “the Greenhouse Effect” after one of the nation’s most well-known journalistic
commentators on the Court, Linda Greenhouse.45 Certainly, it is a decidedly liberal environment—Wright’s ideology scores indicate that
no state has a more liberal citizenry than the nation’s capital. On the
other hand, like many states, its citizens do exhibit interesting variation
in their degree of liberalness over time.46 We measure this variable similar to our variable for personal social influences (“home state”) and
provide a “net liberal” score from Wright’s data. We hypothesize:
H3: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated
with the relative liberalism of their working environment (Washington,
D.C.).
Of course, it is important to consider not just the political environment of Washington, but also the degree to which Justices may have
come to acclimate to the milieu of its distinct social environs (relative
to where they came from). Thus, in an ideal situation we would want
to know how strong Justices’ ties are to their home state and the degree
to which they work to maintain those ties (relative to the potential influence of their new surroundings). Justices may have solidified social
networks (in their home state) within a short period of time while living there, but others may require a longer time (or may have never
developed very strong social ties and identities). In similar fashion,
some Justices may make frequent trips back to their former state of
residence and some may keep communications with former friends and
colleagues more up to date—certainly, advances in communication
technology and the advent of social media opportunities makes this an
even more complex situation. Of course, operationalizing such a varied
and difficult-to-measure set of related phenomena is problematic to
say the least.

45. See BAUM, supra note 5, at 149–51. In some exploratory analysis Baum finds that Republican D.C. newcomers do, in fact, tend to drift left more than Republican Justices who were
already based in D.C. or Democrats (generally), although he cautions that these findings do not
rule out alternative explanations for such drift.
46. For instance, the percentage of self-identified liberals in the District of Columbia
ranges from a low of 16.7 (in 1978) to a high of 54.5 (in 2000). Similar fluctuations can be found
in our constructed “net liberal” score although they are less intuitive. See Erikson, et al. supra
note 40.
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However, we do wish to address this concern over competing influences between Washington and Justices’ home states’ environs and
accordingly have constructed a measure that indicates the number of
years that a Justice has been on the Court, presumably attenuating
their ties to their home state through the passage of time in a distant
location (Washington, D.C.). However, recall that Washington, D.C.
is a distinctly liberal environment (relative to all U.S. states). Thus,
incorporating this measure allows us to shed additional light on the
fabled “Greenhouse Effect,” which suggests that Justices grow increasingly liberal over their tenure in D.C. Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H4: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated
with the number of years the Justice has spent working in Washington, D.C.
C. Elite Partisan Cues
If we consider Justices of the Supreme Court to be, in essence, human decision makers who see case facts and law through a lens of their
personal belief systems, then we can draw important information from
general political behavior based theories of how citizens’ world views
or policy attitudes are developed and adjusted. Two dominant theories
seek to explain the relationship between partisanship and policy preferences: the party conversion thesis and issue conversion. The party
conversion thesis put forward by Fiorina47 among others, and more recently revised by Achen48 through a Bayesian updating model is not
readily applicable to a model of Supreme Court Justices since they do
not exhibit changes in partisanship (at least in the span of time that we
examine). Issue conversion, however, may provide at least one alternative account of dynamic policy preferences linked to membership in a
political party. Green and Palmquist49 and Green, Palmquist, and

47. See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections
(1981); Morris P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, 24 POL. BEHAV. 93
(2002).
48. See generally Christopher H. Achen, Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear
Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research, 14 POL. BEHAV. 195 (1992).
49. See generally Donald P. Green & Bradley Palmquist, Of Artifacts and Partisan Instability, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 872 (1990); Donald P. Green & Bradley Palmquist, How Stable is Party
Identification?, 16 POL. BEHAV. 437 (1994).
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Schickler50 offer some of the most compelling evidence for issue conversion—the theory that individuals respond to ideological shifts
within their party by updating their own policy preferences.51 This theory suggests that Justices, like other citizens, update their views in response to ideological shifts within their chosen party. This is because,
like most individuals, their identity with the party constitutes an important component of who they are and how they perceive themselves
and the world. Accordingly, we believe that Justices’ views on policy
may be affected by cues or signals of party ideological shifts as determined by partisan elites. Such adjustments in their policy attitudes
should be reflected in their case voting. We measure partisan cues or
changes in party ideology by examining how they are documented in
party platforms. Budge et al. provide political party policy ideology estimates for twenty-five countries, including the United States.52 They
use content analysis of major parties’ executive election platforms
(manifestos) to determine parties’ overall ideological standing across a
wide range of policy issues. For the United States, these estimates are
based on Democratic and Republican party platforms set forth in presidential election year platforms, with higher scores denoting more
conservative stances and lower scores more liberal views. It is plausible
that intraparty change in ideology does not occur rapidly at only the
time immediately preceding the drafting of the party platform. Rather,
it is likely that such changes occur continually and are merely documented during presidential election years. Accordingly, we interpolate
these scores to provide yearly estimates. Further, we are primarily interested in intraparty variance over time (as opposed to differences between the parties) and therefore assess these estimates as changes, or

50. See generally DONALD P. GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL
PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS (2002).
51. See also Thomas M. Carsey & Geoffrey C. Layman, Changing Sides or Changing Minds?
Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 464 (2006)
(finding that party influence on individuals’ preferences turns on awareness of partisan differences
and issue salience).
52. See generally IAN BUDGE ET AL., MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES: ESTIMATES FOR
PARTIES, ELECTORS, AND GOVERNMENTS 1945–1998 (2001) (providing original measure);
HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN ET AL., MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES II: ESTIMATES FOR
PARTIES, ELECTORS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, EUROPEAN UNION AND
OECD 1990–2003 (2006) (updating the measure).
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first differences, rather than levels. We argue that changes in a Justice’s
party’s ideology have an influence on their world view and policy attitudes and, therefore, are reflected in their case decision-making. We
hypothesize:
H5: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is negatively associated
with conservative shifts in his or her party’s ideology as reflected in executive
partisan political platforms (manifestos).
However, a Justice’s partisan identity may be informed and affected by varied and distinct elite signals and presidential party platform manifestos provide just one avenue of potential policy signaling.
Justices may also come to form their partisan identity and outlook
through information emanating from party actors who serve in Congress. In order to provide a measure of the respective party preferences
in Congress we consider those of the median member of the House of
Representatives of the Justices’ chosen party.53 To determine these
measurement values we utilize the well-known Poole and Rosenthal’s
DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores.54 These scores are based on
past roll call votes with spatial dimensions estimated by differences between lawmakers. Any individual score represents the ideological
placement of a member of Congress in relation to all other members
of Congress.55 As with our party platform manifestos measure, our focus here is on intraparty variance in the House of Representatives over
time (as opposed to party differences) and therefore we assess these

53. See Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court?
Possibly Yes, (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010) (utilizing this approach
in assessing congressional influence on U.S. Supreme Court Justice voting).
54. See Keith Poole & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 105 (2004); Keith Poole et al., Measuring
Bias and Uncertainty in DW-Nominate, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 261 (2009). See
http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm for further details on common space and procedural issues.
55. Again, this calculation was done for the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE
score. Generally, the first dimension is considered to be more reflective of legislator preferences
with occasional historical periods when multiple issue spaces dictate multi-dimensionality (see
also Epstein & Martin, supra note 53, for judicial politics application). Traditionally, multiple
dimension analysis is appropriate only in studies involving the years 1829–1851 and 1937–1970.
Keith Poole, The Decline and Rise of Party Polarization in Congress During the Twentieth Century,
EXTENSIONS, Fall 2005, at 1. Because this paper falls outside these periods, we use only the first
dimension in our analysis.
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estimates as changes, or first differences, rather than levels.56
H6: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is negatively associated
with conservative shifts in his or her party’s ideology as reflected in the ideological positions of members of the Justice’s party in Congress.
D. Relevant controls
Of course, a number of other concerns must be taken into account
in an explanation of Justice voting. Of primary concern are the ideological inclinations that the Justices hold when they begin their tenure
on the Court. If, as some argue, Justices’ policy attitudes are largely
static or stable, then we might expect that the contemporary external
influences on Justice’s world views would have no effect on Justices’
voting. In order to control for this possibility, we include as an important control, the well-known measures of Justices’ ideology (at the
time they ascend the High Bench) initially developed by Segal and
Cover.57 These scores are based on newspaper op-ed writers’ assessment of nominees’ ideological orientations during the time between
the nominees’ nomination and confirmation.
Another important consideration that must be accounted for is the
possibility that Justices are simply reacting to national public opinion
in their voting. As previously discussed, the vast majority of studies assessing the relationship between public opinion and Justice decisionmaking have considered this influence on the Justices as essentially a
singular entity—there is one national opinion and it affects all Justices
in the same manner. Specifically, these studies have used Stimson’s

56. The model findings remain robust when using a similar measure for the Senate. Using
the House provides us the ability to finely measure changes in legislative policy mood due to the
shorter electoral cycle. Given that the time period we study represents a period of partisan realignment, the general partisan responsiveness of the House is useful in our analysis. This usage
and procedure falls in line with the suggested use established by Poole and Rosenthal in KEITH
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL
CALL VOTING (1997) and KEITH POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING
(2005).
57. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989) (finding that the scores explain the
vast majority of the variance in Justices’ lifetime voting records).
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composite index of national liberalism.58 This measure aggregates national level surveys on a wide range of issues to provide a single indicator of national policy mood. We include this measure as an important control and do not make the case that it is not a relevant source
of policy information that Justices may consider—just that it is not the
only one.59
We also wish to account for the possibility that a Justice’s case voting might be influenced by the Court’s certiorari agenda and/or the
effects of the general policy-making climate of the Court’s cumulative
personnel (e.g. case content). Since our dependent variable is dichotomous we cannot adjust the dependent variable to account for this concern as some have suggested.60 Accordingly, we adopt the method used
by Mishler and Sheehan61 and others and include in our model specification the mean ideology score for the Court for the term using the
aforementioned Segal/Cover scores.
Finally, we consider the generally accepted precept that the Court
tends to take on cases for review that it wishes to reverse. We include
a dichotomous variable to indicate those cases in which the party appealing the case to the Supreme Court (the petitioner) is advocating a
liberal position.62 We also note here that our primary hypotheses variables are measured on calendar years and therefore involve a nine

58. See JAMES A. STIMSON, UPDATED FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS,
CYCLES, AND SWINGS, (2d ed. 1999). Updated scores retrieved from James A. Stimson,
UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
59. While the Stimson composite index is the measure most frequently used in such studies, we recognize that some may be concerned that a similar, yet discrete, measure of national
ideology might also warrant consideration and also another variable to assess this proposition.
Stimson’s national ideology measure provides an index of our nation’s citizens’ ideological selfidentification (see Data Files, UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Data.html (last visited
Sept. 23, 2013)). Auxiliary analysis suggests that these measures (national policy mood and national ideological self-identification) represent distinct depictions of national opinion and the
variance inflation factor diagnostics do not indicate problematic collinearity when both are used
together in the model.
60. See Lawrence Baum, Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 905 (1988).
61. See Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 6.
62. Descriptive statistics for all variables used can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix.
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month (or more) lag to the beginning of the Court’s term in October
when it begins hearing and deciding cases.63

IV. Results
Table 1 displays the findings for our logistic regression model of
Justice voting behavior in civil liberties cases. We employ robust standard errors clustered on the individual court case. The model performs
admirably on prediction (compared to the modal category), yielding a
40.4% reduction of error.64 More importantly, the individual variable
coefficients provide intriguing results.65 First, the coefficients for Justices’ personal social influences—home state (institutions-elite) and
home state (citizens)—are statistically significant and in the predicted
direction, providing support for our hypothesis. The coefficients for
elite partisan cues (party platforms and Congress) are also significant
and in the predicted direction. While the local working environment
variable (relative D.C. liberalism) does not yield a statistically significant finding, the Justice’s time on the Court in the D.C. beltway is
significantly associated with liberal voting. Thus, the latter finding
suggests that the fabled “Greenhouse Effect,” as assessed in this study,
may cast some influence on Justices’ voting. Table 2 demonstrates the
impact of the statistically significant micro-public variables on Justices’
voting. We see that the relative impact for a Justice’s time working in
Washington, D.C. is more pronounced than the more modest but still
substantively meaningful effects of home state influences or elite partisan influences. Taken in tandem (e.g. simultaneous movements in

63. We also incorporate state indicator (dummy) variables to control for all state-level
cross-sectional variation, thus restricting the model to explaining within-state home environment
effects on distal judicial actors. Thus, our state citizen ideology effect (discussed infra notes 42–
43 and accompanying text) can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit increase in citizen liberalism within a (home) state on the probability of a Justice voting in a liberal direction on a case.
The same holds true for the effect that we find for our measure of state elite actor liberalism on
Justice voting (discussed infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text).
64. Auxiliary analysis of variance inflation factors indicates that multicollinearity is not
problematic for this model.
65. The indicator (dummy) variables for Justices’ home states are not displayed. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
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multiple micro-publics), we could envision a scenario in which the cumulative potential impact of home state social cues and elite partisan
signals on Justice voting could in fact be rather substantial.
In sum, our results indicate that there is good reason to believe that
Justice voting, and Supreme Court policy making, are tied to Justices’
relevant micro-publics in important and interesting ways. Our results
may also provide some insight on the question of the relationship between external (i.e. non-legal or attitudinal) concerns such as public
opinion and Justice voting. We find that Justices’ personal social
(home state) and partisan ties are associated with their voting behavior,
but find little support for a national level public opinion effect. Of
course, we do not suggest that such an effect is not viable, just that we
do not find it here. Similarly, while we do not endeavor a full assessment of the institutional threat versus personal social mechanism question, we do suggest that it is unlikely that Justices feel that their institution’s viability or independence is hurt or helped by case voting that
is congruent with the micro-publics that we find to be associated with
voting outcomes (e.g. Justices’ home state citizens). It is more likely
that their votes are tied to these forces in the same way that we might
witness such a relationship in ordinary citizens’ life decisions—these
information sets may inform their world view and perhaps help define
their social identity.

V. Conclusion
Indeed, many of the questions that we seek to answer regarding
judicial behavior and our approaches to those questions may be informed by thinking about how Justices make decisions in light of how
all citizens make important choices in their professional and personal
lives.66 As Justice Scalia once commented, “it’s a little unrealistic to talk
about the Court as though it’s a continuous, unchanging institution

66. To be sure, scholars of political behavior have found important and interesting differences in the behavior of elites and non-elites as well as those who possess high levels and low
levels of relevant information (See, e.g., J. R. HIBBING & E. THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH
DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENTS SHOULD WORK (2002)).
We only argue that Supreme Court Justices are, at bottom line, human decision makers and as
such are susceptible, at some level, to many of things that may influence all people in making
important decisions.
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rather than to some extent necessarily a reflection of the society in
which it functions.”67 Certainly, the tendency of Supreme Court Justices to drift from early decision-making patterns to unanticipated jurisprudence has vexed both the Presidents who appoint them and the
scholars who study them. While academics have done an excellent job
of documenting and tracking Justice drift,68 they have perhaps been
less successful at explaining or predicting it. Why does Justice drift
elude us? Hanson and Benforado suggest that an underlying problem
may be with the way we conceptualize and approach explaining human
behavior more generally.69 They argue that in attempting to explain
human behavior (and more specifically Justices’ voting behavior and
drift) we tend to overstate the degree to which dispositional factors
(e.g. attitudes, choice, strategy, and will) drive behavior and underestimate the influences of situational and contextual concerns, such as environment and subconscious processes.
Thus, attempts to explain and predict Justice behavior by focusing
on their innate and unswerving sincere ideological preferences or their
strategic attempts to consciously promote those preferences may be
missing an important consideration: that Justices, at some level, may
not completely willfully dictate their behaviors or their views toward
certain objects, laws, or other phenomena.70 Rather, they may be influenced in important ways by situation and circumstance—the milieu
of events, stimuli, and social interactions that define their daily lives,
indeed, “the times” in which they live. Further, it may turn on the micro-publics from which they glean personal meaning and social identity. To be sure, we must be careful in considering possible causal
mechanisms suggested by the relationship between micro-publics and
Justices’ voting. At this juncture it is difficult to parse whether Justices
are reacting directly to micro-publics or if micro-publics merely reflect

67. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 19, at 1020.
68. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success Through Supreme
Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557 (2000) (assessing Justices’ drift from the ideology of
their appointing President).
69. See generally Jon Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court
Makes Justices More Liberal, 31 BOSTON REV. 23 (2006).
70. See generally John Irwin & Daniel Real, Unconscious Influence in Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2010).
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the underlying common stimuli of shared events and conditions that
influence them as well as Justices who are similarly processing such
information and the emotional nuances of the human experience. Still,
our empirical findings provide intriguing insight on how these currents run and reveal themselves. Thus, the findings of our study may
have important implications for studies of Supreme Court Justice voting that focus solely or primarily on Justices’ conscious goal-directed
or strategic behavior, to the exclusion of situational or personal environmental considerations.71
In coming to grips with the potential value of micro-publics and
Justices’ “times” in helping to understand Justices’ voting, there are a
good number of remaining questions for future research. These include alternate micro-publics such as media, competing elite cues, and
professional organizations, among others. Further, Justices may process such micro-publics differentially, depending on their background
or other personal characteristics. We have investigated here only a
handful of such explanations and future research will undoubtedly find
more that are worthy of examination.

71. See, e.g., DOES CONSCIOUSNESS CAUSE BEHAVIOR? (Susan Pockett et al. eds., 2006).
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Table 1 – Logistic Regression Results for Justice Votes
in Civil Liberties Cases – Likelihood of a Liberal Vote
Variable

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Robust S.E.

t-score

Home State Liberalism
(institutions - elite)

.00304*

1.00304

0.00162

1.87

Justice Party Conservatism
Change (Congress)

-4.76731**

0.00850

2.33717

-2.04

Justice Time in DC

.014626**

1.01473

0.00426

3.43

DC Liberalism

-0.00092

0.99908

0.00183

-0.50

Home State Liberalism
(citizen)

.00528*

1.00529

0.00301

1.75

Justice Party Conservatism Change (party platform)

-.03968**

0.96110

0.01284

-3.09

National Public
Liberalism (policy mood)

-0.00015

0.99985

0.01369

-0.01

National Public Liberalism (self identification)

0.02054

1.02076

0.02256

0.91

Justice Liberalism
(Segal Cover score)

2.44214**

11.49760

0.12720

19.20

Court Liberalism
(mean Segal Cover score)

-2.35341**

0.09504

0.93224

-2.52

Petitioner brings liberal
Case to Court

.95157**

2.58977

0.07868

12.09

Constant

-1.24685

0.97729

-1.28

N = 1437
*P<.05, **P<.01
Robust standard errors are clustered on case citation.
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Table 2 – Probability Impact of Micro-Publics on
Justices’ Liberal Voting*

Variable

Probability At Mini- Probability At
mum Value
Mean Value

Probability At
Maximum Value

Home state liberalism
(institutions – elite)(+)

0.408

0.440

0.476

Home state liberalism
(citizens)(+)

0.413

0.443

0.480

Justice Party conservatism
change (congress)(-)

0.483

0.437

0.391

Justice party conservatism
change (party platform)(-)

0.481

0.443

0.403

Justice time in DC (+)

0.395

0.442

0.512

* Marginal effects for a specific variable are computed while holding other binary variables
at their modal values and other continuous variables at their mean values.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 – Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Liberal vote

0.47877

0.49956

0

1

Home state liberalism (institutions – elite)

49.47224

22.23969

1.25

92.51428

Justice party conservatism (congress)

0.00552

0.01239

-0.033

0.046

Justice time in DC

14.47264

7.72507

1

33

DC liberalism

-0.49403

23.5224

-47

41

Home state liberalism (citizen)

-11.67462

8.24225

-34.8

16

Justice party conservatism (party platform)

0.85729

2.07970

-3.09412

4.8275

National public liberalism (policy mood)

56.54668

3.42873

50.854

62.47

National public liberalism (self-identification) 35.48501

1.91292

31.838

38.95

Justice liberalism (Segal Cover score)

0.36824

0.31642

0

1

Court liberalism (mean Segal Cover score)

0.36712

0.06237

0.24167

0.43778

Petitioner brings liberal case to Court

0.44343

0.49680

0

1
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